This article examines the recent dynamics of European imperialism in Libya in the light of Marx's theory of the global reserve army of labour. It analyses the limited advance of Western imperialism in Libya in the decade before the 2011 uprisings, the interactions between local, regional and international forces during and after the NATO intervention, and, finally, the evolving migratory patterns from Libya. In this light, the instability along the southern and eastern Mediterranean coastline -a product of the uprisings and the forms of political reactions they unleashed -is simultaneously a security threat and a channel of migratory movements to European capitalism.
Introduction
Tony Norfield and John Smith focus on finance and industrial production restructuring respectively, not on war and migration. 2 The lack of substantial debate on the more recent dynamics of European imperialism leads to an underestimation of the impact of southern workers' agency and popular resistance. In 2011, while the US embarked on withdrawing from Iraq and Afghanistan, the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt soon spread throughout North Africa and the Middle East. In mid-February demonstrators throughout Libya demanded the fall of the regime.
Because of the potential consequences of the uprisings both within and beyond the region, western leaders were deeply concerned and awaited an opportunity to intervene.
This came with Gaddafi's brutal repression of the uprisings. Started under the aegis of the 'Responsibility to Protect' framework, the NATO intervention soon turned into a mission for regime-change, proving once again how the rhetoric of humanitarianism was a pretext for pursuing neo-colonial interests. The war served both economic and geopolitical goals, and exposed the divisions between US and European imperialism, and between European powers themselves.
Developing an analysis of the Libya intervention and its aftermath serves two purposes:
first, to clarify the nature of imperialism today, and second, to cast light on some interpretations of events in Libya. Within the rather scant critical literature on Libya, on the one hand there are interpretations that focus on the western attempt to secure control on Libyan resources and get rid of a relatively progressive Gaddafi. On the other, there are interpretations that focus on the Gaddafi regime's repressive and neoliberal character but fail to take fully into account the extent to which outside interventions reflected the interests of the powers concerned. 3 Our analysis seeks to overcome these limitations and highlight the complexity of how imperialism functions today involving as it does inter-state rivalries not just among western powers but also among Russia, China and regional actors. In order to provide a full account, moreover, these rivalries need to be analysed against the backdrop of the global dynamics of capitalist accumulation and the development of the reserve army of labour. This is, as we discuss in the following section, one of the main contribution of Marx's own conceptualisation of the link between capitalism and imperialism in Capital Volume 1. In the light of this analysis, the article discusses the limited advance of western imperialism in Libya in the decade before the uprisings; the interactions between local, regional and international forces during and after the NATO intervention, and, finally, the development of the reserve army of labour and the evolving patterns of migration from Libya to Europe.
The final section concludes.
Capitalism, imperialism and crisis
Marxist debates on imperialism start from the assumption that Marx's Capital focuses on a self-enclosed national economy in a specific historical phase of accumulation rather than on the overall tendency of the system as a totality. 4 In analysing capital reproduction, however, Marx treats 'the whole world as one nation', anticipating Rosa Luxemburg's insight that 'if the analysis of the reproductive process actually intends not any single capitalist country but the capitalist world market, there can be no foreign trade: all countries are "home"'. 5 Crucially, this allowed Marx to take structurally into account the international mobility of capital and labour-power in Capital Volume 1: an argument, advanced by Pradella (2010 Pradella ( , 2013 , which has been largely overlooked in the scholarship. Marx also identified the trend towards increasing firm sizes and growth of 'finance capital' that for Lenin characterise contemporary imperialism. 6 By distinguishing concentration and centralisation of capital, Marx recognised the importance of mergers and acquisitions, the formation of joint stock companies, and the growth of a financial aristocracy less and less involved in the actual production process.
Nevertheless, he deemed the isolation between 'capital in the production process' and 'capital-property, capital outside the production process and yielding interest of itself'
to be the highest form of fetishism. This approach also sheds light on the ways in which these intertwined social and political relations react back on Europe. As several scholars have argued, as in Marx's example of Ireland mentioned above, the dynamics of the global reserve army of labour and 'the spectacle of militarised border enforcement' impact on political and social relations within Europe itself. 20 Border controls do not stop immigration, but make it more dangerous and expensive, and immigrants more vulnerable, including to human smugglers. Borders function as a filtering device for prospective immigrants and expulsions push them either to move to other EU countries or find jobs in the informal sector. 21 Immigration restrictions thus reinforce the process of labour market segmentation and precarisation in receiving countries, contributing to restoring profitability and competitiveness in a changing geography of accumulation. The narrative of a 'migration crisis', moreover, seeks to shift attention away from imperialism and prevent the international conjunction of labour and social struggles.
The limited advance of Western imperialism in Libya (1999-2011)
Looking at imperialism as a system of accumulation that operates internationally helps prices. In the 2000s oil revenues were increasingly invested in international financial markets rather than in production and basic services, or appropriated by the ruling elites and invested abroad, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. 29 The large but declining public sector continued to be the main source of employment for Libyan citizens, but its monthly wages had been frozen at $180-215 for two decades and rose only marginally in 2007. In 2006 the government adopted a programme to transfer 400,000 government employees out of the public sector; by 2009, however, less than half of them had successfully moved into the private sector. In 2010, unemployment levels were estimated at 30 per cent, youth unemployment at 48 per cent. 30 Despite popular discontent at the lack of job opportunities, Gaddafi actively encouraged immigration from Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East. A large proportion of jobs in the oil, construction, agricultural and services sectors were carried out by immigrants.
In 2011, with a population of 6.5 million citizens, there were at least 2.5 million immigrants in Libya, mainly from West Africa, the Horn of Africa, the Middle East and South Africa. Immigration fuelled labour market competition in the low-wage sector of the economy: black Africans performed the least-paid jobs compared to Arabicspeaking immigrants or those who could enter legally, and came under increasing attack as institutionalised racism and popular discontent grew. 31 Trade unions had long been banned, and all forms of political and community organisation were harshly repressed.
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Gaddafi also adopted a strategy of uneven development targeting 'rebel' regions. 
Continuing politics by other means
The 2011 uprising and Gaddafi's repressive response gave the Western powers the opportunity to intervene to reshape Libya to conform more to their interests. But, as the theoretical framework we have outlined would predict, this intervention has been marked by the conflicts of interest among the major imperialist states, Russia, China and regional power actors. It has also been, at least partially, blunted by the initiatives of Libyan political forces, often acting in concert with rival outside powers.
In the wake of the global economic crisis Libya did not experience the same level of economic distress as other countries in the region. Both economic and political factors, however, help explain the origins of the uprisings: the lack of democracy, the failure of the state to diversify the economy, the worsening social conditions amidst the enrichment of the ruling family, the marginalization of Cyrenaica, and the inspiration from the movements in Tunisia and Egypt. 38 As elsewhere, the Libyan uprisings started as an unarmed grass-roots movement, but the role of organised labour was much weaker than in Tunisia and Egypt. Brutal repression by Gaddafi's security forces, moreover, contributed to the rapid militarisation of the uprising, marginalising the youth and 'civil society' forces. Calls for an internationally enforced no-fly zone grew louder and a political leadership, the National Transition Council (NTC), was rapidly established.
France -eager to take advantage of the crisis to establish itself in a country where other European states were ahead of it -was the first imperialist power to recognise the NTC forming alliances with the Tobruk government. 54 The US seems to have focused on the ISIS presence in eastern Libya: US airstrikes supported a successful operation by GNA militias to expel ISIS from the city of Sirte in December 2016. Russia, after its successful pro-Assad military intervention in Syria staked its claim to supplant the US as the regional power-broker, has also lent political and military support to Haftar in return for a share in Libya's oil, construction and infrastructural contracts. 55 Since 2012 Chinese delegations have also been back, signing several lucrative contracts for housing and infrastructural projects with the Tobruk-government. 56 Italy is the lead EU power in Libya. Due to the off-shore nature of its activities, ENI's production levels in Libya actually rose above the pre-2011 levels. 57 In January 2017 Italy re-opened its embassy in Tripoli and reinforced its diplomatic activities also with the goal of containing Russia's increasing influence in the region.
According to UNCTAD in 2015 Libya's top five trade partners were Italy, Germany, Planning to strengthen the neoliberal reforms already underway under Gaddafi, however, the western-backed NTC could not fulfil the popular socio-economic and political aspirations that had animated the Libyan uprising; it rather channelled social discontent towards factional fighting, unleashing a spiral of retribution and divisions.
The liberal pro-western political elite, however, soon lost control of the country, as proved by the killing of the US ambassador and destruction of the CIA headquarters, the civil war and subsequent withdrawal of international actors from Libya. While the political and economic meltdown and division of the country is in line with the imperialist 'divide and rule' strategy, it is hard to distinguish any real form of political 'rule' that has been achieved. The scramble for Libya's wealth has been obstructed by security concerns and lack of political unity. Local forces acting in concert with regional actors have limited the influence of western imperialism, leaving more space for Russia, China, and regional actors.
The NATO intervention and the civil war exacerbated social divides in Libya, leading to the impoverishment of vast swathes of the population, extreme human rights abuses, and an unprecedented displacement crisis. Because of this socio-economic and political situation, including the rise in racism and racist attacks, the number of immigrants in the country has declined while the transit towards Europe of African and Syrian emigrants and refugees has increased. This has been the case especially after the EU-Turkey deal in March 2016, which forced emigrants and refugees to return from the Balkan to the Central Mediterranean route. The closure but increasing porosity of the borders between Libya and neighbouring African countries and the continuing externalisation and militarisation of the EU borders have made human smuggling an even more profitable activity, mainly managed by local militias in collaboration with state institutions. By continuing to support Libyan detention efforts, EU countries, starting from Italy, are deeply involved in these human rights abuses. The lack of political unity and evolving power relations in Libya, however, are limiting their control over the reserve army of labour in the region. The instability along the southern and eastern Mediterranean coastline -a product of the 2011 uprising and the different forms of political reactions they unleashed -is therefore both a channel of migratory movements and a security threat to European capitalism.
